For firms in an oligopoly service network, demand learning based dynamics pricing is an efficient way to maximize their revenues. This paper introduces a Bayesian method to learn demand behavior from the perspective of game-theoretic dynamics, where non-parametric techniques for nonlinear time series are incorporated, such that stringent parametric assumptions are removed. We determine the unknown quantities in our demand learning model from historical market data through a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. Based on the calibrated model, how future demands respond to prices can be predicted, and the optimal pricing policy for the next planning period is obtained by a heuristic optimization algorithm. Simulated examples show that our new method is efficient for integrating demand learning and dynamic pricing, and capable of discovering a wide range of demand dynamics.
Introduction.
Pricing decision plays a central role in firms' revenue optimization problems, especially when the market is competitive, and the identity of the firm is not important to customers [10] . For a specific planning period in the future, prices set by a firm could either be constant in that period, or vary over time. In revenue management, these two pricing strategies are known as static pricing and dynamic pricing respectively. Clearly, dynamic pricing is a more general approach, and is adaptive to changing market conditions. With the rapid growing computer network and powerful databases, historical market information can be conveniently recorded and analyzed. Based on the analysis, a firm could forecast market's response to its future pricing policy, and accordingly set appropriate pricing policy to maximize its profits in the short run. In this sense, demand learning and dynamic pricing are two critical components in revenue maximization that require novel models and computational techniques in statistics, optimization and game theory.
In the revenue management literature, some researchers modeled future demand as a random variable whose distribution is pre-specified. Gallego and van Ryzin [7] assumed that customers arrive according to a Poisson process, with exponentially distributed reservation prices in their minds. Under this assumption, optimal pricing policy can be derived in a closed analytical form. Aviv and Pazgal [19] and Araman and Caldentey [18] extended this idea and assumed that reservation prices are gamma-distributed and two-point distributed, respectively. However, under this framework, beliefs about the distributions of several random variables have to be put a priori and the dynamic game of pricing between multiple firms was ignored.
On the other hand, many statistical models have been proposed to learn the mechanism of demands, either by experimentation or by studying historical market data. Balvers and Cosimano [13] first modeled demands as a linear function of prices with unknown slope and intercept. Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano [11] further examined the incentives of demand learning and established two necessary conditions for a firm to learn uncertain demand curve from experiments. Dada and Petruzzi [12] considered a demand model with both additive and multiplicative stochastic components whose distributions are updated over time by Bayes' rule.
After demand behavior of customers is learnt, how demands response to prices in the future can be forecasted and the optimal pricing policy for the next planning period will be given by an optimizer for dynamic pricing, such that the expected revenue is the greatest of revenues generated by all possible pricing policies. Therefore, an efficient demand learning model which gives accurate predictions is critical to pricing decisions, especially to dynamic pricing. For an overview of literatures on optimization approaches for dynamic pricing, see Talluri and van Ryzin [10] and Bitran and Caldentey [6] .
Recently, Bertsimas and Perakis [4] assumed that demand is a linear function of the firm's price and its competitors' prices and solved for the optimal pricing policy by dynamics programming. Kwon et al. [3] later considered a demand mechanism from the perspective of evolutionary game theory, where the relationship between demand and price is characterized by an evolutionary dynamics. This is a natural way to model market behavior and greatly facilitates the modeling of competition between service providers. They further used an algorithm based on a gap function for the optimization. However, their study assumed that unobservable state variables in their demand learning model follow a random walk, which restricts the generalization of this strategy since the pricing policy would not be optimal if this strict assumption is violated.
In this paper, we propose a general state-space framework for demand learning that consists of a state equation and an observation equation. Loosely speaking, the state equation describes the evolution of unobservable state variables of the system, while the observation equation gives the connection between latent state variabels and observable data that we collected. The state-space model has been a powerful tool in modeling and forecasting dynamic systems that was introduced by Kalman [15] and Kalman and Bucy [16] . For linear Gaussian state-space model, Kalman filter yields good estimation and prediction. If the system is not linear, the solution requires approximation or computation-intensive methods based on numerical integration. Pole and West [1] used Gaussian quadrature techniques in a Bayesian analysis of nonlinear dynamics model and Carlin et al. [2] developed a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach for nonlinear and nonGaussian state-space model.
Since linearity is a special case of nonlinearity, this work will in general assume nonlinear state dynamics of the system. Moreover, we will not impose restrictions on the nonlinear structure of state variables dynamics, but learn it from the historical data that is available to us. To be more precise, the state equation is described by a nonparametric functional-coefficient autoregressive (FAR) model such that the prior assumption of a parametric structure is not required. We then develop a Bayesian method using MCMC algorithm to estimate model parameters, latent state variables, and functional-coefficients jointly. Finally, we employ a simulated annealing algorithm in the optimization problem to obtain the optimal pricing policy for the next planning period.
In the remaining of this paper, we will present our general state-space model describing demand dynamics and the evolution of underlying state variables in section 2. In section 3, we will explain estimation and prediction procedures for our state-space model. Section 4 presents a heuristic optimization approach that gives the optimal dynamic pricing policy. Then different learning strategies are compared through simulation studies in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we provide closing remarks.
2 Revenue Management Model. 2.1 Demand Learning Model. We assume that customers are sensitive to price changes. In other words, if the price for a specific product or service offered by a firm decreases, demand will increase. However, how sensitive of the total demand to price change is one of the unknown quantities that we need to estimate. Therefore, we assume that at time t, customs have a reference price in mind which reflects historical prices and competitors' prices. In particular, the reference priceπ(t) is the weighted moving average price of past k time points of all firms:
where F is the set of firms, p f is the weight for firm f , and f ∈F τ ∈[t−k,t) p f (τ ) = 1. By choosing k, the impact significance of historical prices on the current market is specified. Then at time t, the change in demand for the service offered by a firm f ∈ F ,
dt , is a function of the difference between current price and reference price. Following the evolutionary gametheoretic dynamics introduced by Kwon et al. [3] , D f (t) evolves as follows:
The exogenous quantity η f is the price sensitivity mentioned above, which controls how quickly market demand reacts to price changes of service from firm f . Firms estimate this unknown quantity from the past market data.
This equation describes the connection between unobservable price sensitivities and observed demands and prices, and is usually called an observation equation in the state-space model context.
State Variables Dynamics.
Since price sensitivity cannot be directly observed, they are collectively called state variables in the state-space representation and their evolution will be described by the state equation in our state-space model. Note that price sensitivity η f may exhibit periodic patterns like other time series in economics and business that vary over time. For example, consumers may be less sensitive to price changes during Christmas holidays or other special events. Therefore, understanding its dynamics is a critical step in making pricing policy for future planning periods.
Many familiar time series models can be employed to describe the evolution of price sensitivities, such as a stationary autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) model, a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, a nonstationary random walk and a Markov switching model (MSM). However in practice, we may not have sufficient knowledge to pre-specify a parametric model and demand learning cannot be perfectly achieved by arbitrarily assuming one of parametric structures. Moreover, the prediction performance is poor when the data is not driven by the model we assumed.
Fortunately, recent development of nonparametric techniques and computing facilities provide alternatives to model time series, when no prior assumption of a parametric structure is required. In particular, we will use the FAR model proposed by Chen and Tsay [14] that is capable of identifying a wide range of underlying structures of time series data and good at out-of-sample forecasting. Therefore in our problem, the dependence of a state variable η f on its previous values is captured by the state equation:
where η f (t) is denoted by η t for simplicity, (η t−1 , · · · , η t−m2 ) is a lagged vector of previous price sensitivities, and measurable functions f j : R m2 → R, j = 1, · · · , m 1 , are called coefficient functions, or functional-coefficients, whose forms are not specified. This state equation regresses the expectation of current price sensitivity E(η t ) to historical price sensitivities η t−1 , · · · , η t−m1 , with unspecified regression coefficients that vary as functions of lagged price sensitivities
If all regression coefficients are unknown constants, this equation is reduced to a linear regression model. Here, our goal is to estimate functional-coefficients f 1 , f 2 , · · · , f m1 , which provide appreciable flexibility for the state variables' dynamics.
In fact, many popular linear or nonlinear parametric models may be regarded as special cases of the FAR model. Thus if the true state variable dynamics coincides with one of parametric models, our estimated state equation will be reduced to that parametric form. Recently, the FAR model has been widely studied. To mention a few, Hoover et al. [5] applied functionalcoefficient model to longitudinal data. Cai, Fan and Yao [20] applied the local linear regression method to estimate coefficient functions and showed substantial improvements in post-sample forecasts over other parametric models. Tsay [17] further suggested fitting the FAR models to discover nonlinear evolution of the state transition equation when specifying a nonlinear statespace model.
In sum, in our general state-space model, the price sensitivities are captured by the nonparametric FAR model in the state equation and the link between state variables and observed market data is described by a parametric observation equation. Since the demand dynamics is driven by the firm's pricing strategy and consumers' price sensitivity, once price sensitivities in the future planning period are predicted, demand dynamics over the same period is solely determined by the pricing policy that a firm sets. Now the revenue maximization problem reduces to an optimization problem over a closed set of prices.
Demand Learning Based Dynamic Pricing.
The objective of a firm is to maximize revenue, given its limited resources and fixed costs. Moreover, the prices charged by this firm have upper and lower bounds, due to market regulation, customer behaviors and the firm's non-negligible cost. Therefore, a firm faces the following optimization problem:
3 Estimation and Prediction.
So far, we have introduced our revenue management model for demand learning, where demand dynamics is described by a semi-parametric state-space model and an optimal pricing policy that can be obtained by solving an optimization problem. By making use of historical data, we may estimate unknown quantities in the state-space model. Thus predicting future demand corresponding to a specific pricing policy becomes possible in the following optimization procedure.
However, since observations that we use for parameter estimation occur only at discrete times, a whole planning period will be discretized into K sub-intervals with the same length and one observation will be made at the end of each sub-interval. Then the state-space model is formulated as
, and f j in the state equation are measurable functions from R m2 to R 1 . At time k, demand changes ∆D k and price changes ∆π k =π k −π k are known to us and latent price sensitivities can be estimated.
Estimation of the Nonparametic Model.
In our example, we will take m 1 = 2 and m 2 = 1 in (3.6) to avoid overfitting as suggested by Cai, Fan and Yao [20] . The extension to cases m 1 > 2 and m 2 > 1 is straightforward. Therefore the nonparametric state equation in our state-space model becomes
. At the end of each planning period, we estimate η 1 , · · · , η K , σ 2 , ω 2 , f 1 , and f 2 in that period, given observed ∆D 1 , · · · , ∆D K and ∆π 1 , · · · , ∆π K . In particular, we will employ Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to implement Bayesian estimations for unknown quantities. The MCMC method is becoming popular in recent years because of two reasons: (1) Nowadays, powerful computers provide possibilities for implementing this computationally-intensive procedure quickly. (2) New problems in areas like genetics and finance involve highdimensional parameters and missing values but traditional methods are not capable of them. Since there are 4+K unknown quantities here and in general this statespace model is non-linear, a classical procedure such as Kalman filter is not applicable, the MCMC method will be used.
Statistically, the MCMC algorithm is an inference procedure for Bayesian models. To put our state-space model in a Bayesian framework, we need to specify prior distributions for parameters σ 2 and ω 2 . In particular, conjugate priors are specified for convenience: σ 2 ∼ IG(a 0 , b 0 ), and ω 2 ∼ IG(c 0 , d 0 ), where IG refers to inverse gamma distribution. Then for each parameter, its posterior distribution can be derived from the joint distribution of prior distribution and data likelihood. At the i-th iteration of the MCMC sampling procedure, we simply draw a posterior sample from this posterior distribution, which is conditional on samples drawn at the (i − 1)-th iteration. In this way, a sample path for each posterior distribution forms a Markov Chain. We will stop sampling when the Markov Chain is stationary for a while, and average all posterior samples as our estimate.
We will give the MCMC steps at the i-th iteration without detailed derivations:
1. Initialize unknown quantities σ 2 , ω 2 , f 1 , f 2 and η k for k = 1, 2, · · · , K. 
where we define g 1 (η
) as the square of
2 , the variance of errors in the observation equation. Similarly, ω 2 is drawn from its conditional posterior distribution
where g 2 (η
Update latent state variables
where
Since there is no closed form for this posterior distribution, we will use a general approach, or the MetropolisHasting algorithm to sample from this ditribution. That is, we will take a new sample of η k denoted by η * k from the density:
k with the probability min(1, p * ), where
where L(η * k |(.)) denotes the data likelihood evaluated at η * k , and L(η 5. Since we do not assume any parametric structure for f j 's, we need to update the functionalcoefficients f j 's by nonparametric techniques. That is, based on η
K from step 4, we havê
In the above expression, X k = (η
is a kernel function with bandwidth h selected by cross-validation, e j,2 is the 4×1 vector with 1 at the j-th and (2 + j)-th positions,X denotes an K × 1 matrix with
k−1 − u 0 ) as its k-th row, and W is a K × K diagonal matrix with diagonal entries:
Up to now, we have carried out one cycle of the MCMC and are ready to continue sampling for the next cycle by repeating 2 -5. The sample process continues until the chains converge to the stationary distributions or joint posterior distribution. We then collect all posterior samples and average them as Bayesian estimates of the parameters and latent state variables.
Estimation of the Parametic Model.
On the other hand, we may specify parametric forms for f j 's. For example, if we assume that the dynamic of η k follows an AR(1) process, we have m 1 = 1, m 2 = 1, f 1 = φ and f 2 = 0 and our state-space model is reduced to
. We will also outline the MCMC steps for this model, which will be used in our simulation study for comparison purpose in section 5.
Initialize σ
2 , ω 2 , φ, and η k for k = 1, 2, · · · , K.
2. Update σ 2 , variance of errors in the state equation by drawing a new sample σ 2(i) from the following distribution
where g 3 (η
3. Update ω 2 , variance of errors in the observation equation. Similarly, ω 2(i) is sampled from
4. Update latent state variables η k , for k = 1, 2, · · · , K. Again, note that the following posterior distribution is not a closed form:
We will use the accept-reject algorithm or the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm.
, the posterior distribution is also normal with mean Bb and variance B, where
We will sample φ (i) from this distribution.
Likewise, we repeat the process until the chains converge to their joint posterior distributions.
Predicting Future State
Variables. At the end of one planning period, we estimate unknown quantities σ 2 , ω 2 , f 1 , · · · , f m1 and η 1 , · · · , η K in our model using observed demands and prices in the past planning periods. Based on our estimates, the forecasts of price sensitivities in the next planning period can be obtained iteratively:
for j = 1, 2, 3, · · ·, whereη k+j on the left hand side is the j-th step ahead forecast, andη,f andφ on the right hand side are estimated unknown quantities in the model.
Simulated Annealing Algorithm for Pricing.
Finally, our goal is to determine the firm's optimal pricing policy for the next planning period which could maximize the revenue. We use a simulated annealing algorithm [9] here, with price as an independent variable. This approach provides a convenient solution for dynamic pricing, since analytical properties of the target function (convexity, boundedness, smoothness) play a lesser role.
Intuitively, at the j-th iteration, the algorithm inputs a price vector π (j) , which equals to π (j−1) plus a small random noise into our state-space model, which produces predictions of future demand D (j) and revenue R (j) corresponding to this price vector π (j) . If the length of a planning period is K, we have π (j) ∈ R K , D (j) ∈ R K , and R (j) ∈ R 1 . Then if the current revenue increases compared with the previous iteration, or if
will be accepted and will be used in the next iteration; However, if the revenue decreases, or ∆R (j) ≤ 0, π (j) will still be accepted with a certain probability 0 < ρ < 1. This allows the optimizer to escape the attraction of local maximum. An important theorem proved that there exist convergence results in the case of finite spaces [8] .
Therefore, at iteration j the optimization algorithm is:
1. Simulate new price vector ζ from an instrumental distribution with density g(|ζ − π (j−1) |), where
is the proposed price from last iteration;
2. Accept π (j) = ζ with probability ρ = e
where ∆R (j) is the change of revenue, T (j) is called temperature and is set to τ /log(i + 1) usually. τ is a tuning parameter set by user, where a larger τ implies a more greedy optimizer.
The optimizer stops at the J-th iteration, when |∆R (J) | is less than a threshold which is small enough. Then, the optimal pricing policy π * equals to π (J) , corresponding demands and revenue are D * = D (J) and R * = π * · D * , respectively.
Numerical Examples.
Let's consider a monopoly market here. The same paradigm works for oligopolistic competition. For data simulation, we assume two scenarios of underlying state variable dynamics, which are very common in economics or business. That is, market's true price sensitivity η(k) in the past planning period (30 days) either follows the AR(1) process (3.9) or follows a function that is the composition of a sine function and Gaussian noise:
The variances for state equation σ 2 and observation equation ω 2 are set to 0.2 and 1, respectively. Under the first scenario, underlying price sensitivity is very random although autocorrelated, while under the second scenario, price sensitivity exhibits strong periodicity instead of randomness. Based on one of these two true state dynamics, we simulated η k for a planning period of 30 days, and then generated historical prices and demands for the same period. Note that the true dynamics of price sensitivities η k is unknown to firms or service providers.
Given only historical demands and prices, a firm can build its demand learning model using one of the following strategies: (a) No demand learning; (b) a Kalman filter for linear state dynamics considered by Kwon et al. [3] ; (c) the MCMC algorithm with assumed AR(1) dynamics, which is described in section 3.2; (d) the MCMC algorithm with the FAR model described in section 3.1. Once unknown quantities are estimated, the evolution of future price sensitivities can be forecasted by equations in section 3.3. Figure 1 and Figure 2 presented estimated dynamics for the past planning period and predicted dynamics for the coming period by four different strategies. We can see that the FAR model in strategy (d) easily captured the evolution of state dynamics with apparent patterns. Of course in practice, functional-coefficients are able to depict other structures of underlying dynamics driven by different mechanisms. Even for AR(1) dynamics which is more like random noises, the FAR model outperforms other parametric models in post-sample forecasts. Then for each strategy, an optimal pricing policy π * ∈ R 30 for the next planning horizon is determined by the simulated annealing algorithm and realized revenue R * = π * ·D * ∈ R 1 of the next planning horizon (30 days) is shown in Table 1 . We can see that for the scenario where demands are driven by AR(1) price sensitivity process, both strategy (c) and strategy (d) give the greatest revenues. However, if demands are driven by (5.11), strategy (c) will fail while strategy (d) will achieve demand learning successfully. This is obvious since (c) makes the incorrect assumption about state variable dynamics. Therefore, our new method does not depend on model assumption, and is robust over a wide range of unobservable state variable dynamics.
Concluding Remarks.
This paper incorporated a new demand learning strategy from the perspective of evolutionary game theory and showed how this strategy can be used for dynamic pricing problems. A Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm was developed to deal with nonlinear state-space model. A nonparametric technique or in particular a FAR model was integrated to discover dynamics of underlying state variables such that no prior assumption on the model structure is needed. Moreover, a simulated annealing algorithm was employed to solve an optimal control problem. The simulation results showed that our new method provides better estimations and predictions and is robust to different underlying state dynamics. Future research could extend this method to the competition scenario. Also, the efficiency of collaboration between competitors for demand learning could be explored.
